

# Counting Votes and the Attempt to Replicate Human Interpretation

LABELNOISE'2017  
December 1, 2017



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# Motivation

Attempt to interest you in an noisy label application area:

- Counting votes - replicating human interpretation


Also, if there's time:

- Turing Test-inspired view of performance evaluation

Key features:

- Vitally important application, drawn from real life
- Valuable lessons to learn that can be applied elsewhere
- Wonderful opportunity to apply our talents
- Work still needed to frame problem, outline next steps

# How did US get where we are today?





The infamous butterfly ballot from the 2000 Presidential election.



Bush v. Gore.



# Hanging Chads and Voter Intent



Votomatic technology used in Florida was prone to paper jams. This led to hanging and dimpled chads, making it hard to determine voter intent.

<http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/cards/chad.html>  
<http://www.pushback.com/justice/votefraud/DimpledChadPictures.html>

# Next Big Step ... Backward

Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine

Electronic Voting Systems:  
the Good, the Bad, and the Stupid

**SECURITY ALERT: July 4, 2005**

**Critical Security Issues with Diebold Optical Scan Design**

Security Assessment of the Diebold Optical Scan Voting Terminal

**Pennsylvania voters: trust but verify**

Poll finds most want ballot verification

**Electronic Voting System Usability Issues**

THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY:  
PROTECTING ELECTIONS  
IN AN ELECTRONIC WORLD

**Hack-a-Vote: Security  
Issues with Electronic  
Voting Systems**


**Analysis of an Electronic Voting System**

**Privacy Issues in an Electronic Voting Machine**

**SECURITY ALERT: May 11, 2006**

**Critical Security Issues with Diebold TSx**

Trusted Agent Report  
Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System



HBO DOCUMENTARY

Candidate A Candidate B

-0005 +0005

**HACKING DEMOCRACY**  
An HBO Documentary Film  
9 pm Thursday

"The bottom line is if we don't have the ability to authenticate our own elections as citizens, we don't live in a democracy."

HBO Documentary Films presents [Hacking Democracy](#), Thursday at 9 pm.

[VIDEO ▶ Preview Hacking Democracy](#)



# Voting in the News: Take 3

## The Voting Technology We Really Need? Paper

Software-independent backup systems are more important than ever.

LAWRENCE NORDEN | MAY 10, 2017 | TECHNOLOGY

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TEXT SIZE

- +

In January, America's main intelligence agencies issued [a report concluding](#) that Russia interfered in the 2016 election, using a combination of cyber-intrusion, espionage, and propaganda. In addition to the details provided in this account, media outlets have since reported that several election databases were hacked [before](#) and [after](#) the election. While the Department of Homeland Security [found no evidence](#) any of these efforts manipulated vote tallies, the assaults have left many Americans asking: Just how safe are voting machines from cyberattack?

The answer is not reassuring.

<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/the-voting-technology-we-really-need-paper/524820/>  
<https://gcn.com/articles/2017/10/03/return-paper-ballots.aspx>



## Russian hacking fuels return to paper ballots

By Jenni Bergal | Oct 03, 2017

*This article originally appeared in Stateline, an initiative of the Pew Charitable Trusts.*

After the "hanging chad" fiasco during the 2000 presidential recount, many states and counties switched to electronic-only voting machines to modernize their systems.

Now, amid security concerns over Russian hackers targeting state voting systems in last year's election, there's a renewed focus on shifting to paper ballots.

In Virginia, election officials decided last month to stop using paperless touch-screen machines, in an effort to safeguard against unauthorized access to the equipment and improve the security of the state's voting system.

In Georgia, which uses electronic voting machines with no paper record, legislators are discussing getting rid of their aging equipment and using

### MORE INFO

**Virginia considers decertifying touchscreen voting machines**  
The state could accelerate the move to systems that provide a paper trail for election audits.  
[Read more.](#)

# Voting in the News: Take 3

Virginia Politics

## Paper ballots make a comeback in Virginia this fall



In face of hacks and attempted hacks, paper ballots make a comeback in Virginia this fall. (Paul J. Richards/Agence France-Presse Via Getty Images)

By Patricia Sullivan October 7



### The Computer Scientist Who Prefers Paper

Barbara Simons believes there is only one safe voting technology.

JILL LEOVY | DECEMBER 2017 ISSUE | TECHNOLOGY

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/paper-ballots-make-a-comeback-in-virginia-this-fall/2017/10/07/>

<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/12/guardian-of-the-vote/544155/>

# A Simple Yet Vexing Case Study: Counting Votes Recorded on Paper

Topic of current interest where the legal need to respect voter intent transforms a seemingly trivial pattern recognition problem into much more complex task.





# Research Questions

Issues that arise from using paper ballots in elections:


- Accurate interpretation of marginal markings.
- Human cost, error rate, and bias in performing manual recounts.
- Failure modes in ballot imaging (e.g., paper jams).
- Systematic errors due to ballot layout (one candidate may be disadvantaged over another based on physical location on page).

Also keep in mind:

- U.S. elections can be complex (10's to 100's of choices).
- Impact of "voter error" (e.g., improper markings, erasures).
- Potential for traditional ballot-box stuffing.
- Computer hackers attempting to manipulate the vote.

# Why isn't this a solved problem?

Students have been taking standardized tests using op-scan answer sheets for decades ...



- While accuracy rates are very high, problems do occur.
- Compared to voters, students are a much more homogeneous (and well-educated) population.
- Standardized testing is NOT anonymous. Students can (and do) complain when they receive a lower score than they expect.


# Connection to Forms Processing

Similarities to forms processing, but also some key differences:

- Much broader range of users (education level, literacy, etc.) than for traditional forms applications.
- Ballots must preserve a voter's anonymity.
- Demand to count votes and report results quickly.
- Elections are held infrequently, so voting equipment sits unused for long periods in storage.
- Poll workers often lack technical expertise.
- Maintaining chain-of-custody is a critical security requirement.
- No *financial* interest in making sure votes are counted accurately, but there is tremendous *public* interest.

# Counting Votes Not So Easy

Real ballot from an election in California:



One of these votes was counted correctly by the op-scan equipment, the other was not.

Note: this does not mean voting on paper ballots is bad, just (1) manual audits should be mandatory, and (2) more research is needed.

"Improving California's 1% Manual Tally Procedure," Joseph Lorenzo Hall, UC Berkeley School of Information, EVT Workshop 2008.



# Whole-Ballot Recognition

The image shows two identical ballot forms for the 'BASEBALL HALL OF FAME (vote for no more than 5)'. Each ballot lists ten candidates with radio buttons: Ty Cobb, Rogers Hornsby, Walter Johnson, Nap Lajoie, Christy Mathewson, Babe Ruth, Tris Speaker, Honus Wagner, and Cy Young. In the left ballot, a red circle highlights the radio button for Rogers Hornsby, with a red arrow pointing to it from the text 'Stray mark?'. In the right ballot, a green circle highlights the radio button for Rogers Hornsby, with a green arrow pointing to it from the text 'Valid vote?'. Below the ballots, blue text asks 'But these two marks are identical!'.

BASEBALL HALL OF FAME  
(vote for no more than 5)

- Ty Cobb
- Rogers Hornsby
- Walter Johnson
- Nap Lajoie
- Christy Mathewson
- Babe Ruth
- Tris Speaker
- Honus Wagner
- Cy Young

Stray mark?

Valid vote?

But these two marks are identical!

BASEBALL HALL OF FAME  
(vote for no more than 5)

- Ty Cobb
- Rogers Hornsby
- Walter Johnson
- Nap Lajoie
- Christy Mathewson
- Babe Ruth
- Tris Speaker
- Honus Wagner
- Cy Young

Can we capture voter intent via style-based techniques?

# Style-Based Mark Recognition

## ***Traditional Forms Processing***

## ***Style-Base Ballot Mark Recognition***

*Can the system interpret the voter's intent? (If a human judge would interpret a marking as an intended vote, then the voting machine should do the same.)*

Can fail to record some votes simply because they do not satisfy an arbitrary criterion (e.g., a fixed threshold on the number of black pixels).

Assume a voter is self-consistent when marking his/her ballot.

Create a style-based classifier from a set of style-specialized classifiers to improve recognition accuracy.

***Limiting***

***Promising***

"Style-Based Ballot Mark Recognition," P. Xiu, D. Lopresti, H. Baird, G. Nagy, and E. Barney Smith, *Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition*, July 2009, Barcelona, Spain, pp. 216-220.


# Challenging Cases

## A Style-Consistent Field

### Human Interpretation


VNNN, NVNN, NNVN, NVNN, NNNV

(V for Vote, N for Non-vote)




## Variations in Marking Style

Check, ex, and filled marks (left)  
vs. noisy non-votes (right)



"Style-Based Ballot Mark Recognition," P. Xiu, D. Lopresti, H. Baird, G. Nagy, and E. Barney Smith, *Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition*, July 2009, Barcelona, Spain, pp. 216-220.

# System Design



"Style-Based Ballot Mark Recognition," P. Xiu, D. Lopresti, H. Baird, G. Nagy, and E. Barney Smith, *Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition*, July 2009, Barcelona, Spain, pp. 216-220.

# Style-Based Performance

**Table 3. Target-level error rates (top) and field-level error rates (bottom).**

Sample Set	Classifier					
	Check	Ex	Filled	Blend	Separate	Style-based
Check	2.36%	7.46%	25.00%	1.97%	4.35%	2.78%
Ex	0.40%	0.34%	16.16%	0.40%	0.40%	0.35%
Filled	2.75%	2.38%	1.10%	2.75%	2.50%	1.09%
Average	1.84%	3.39%	14.09%	1.70%	2.42%	1.41%

Sample Set	Classifier					
	Check	Ex	Filled	Blend	Separate	Style-based
Check	38.30%	83.25%	100.00%	33.43%	61.08%	42.85%
Ex	7.77%	6.70%	99.30%	7.77%	7.77%	6.75%
Filled	53.18%	46.07%	20.75%	53.18%	48.55%	20.63%
Average	33.08%	45.34%	73.35%	31.46%	39.13%	23.41%

"Style-Based Ballot Mark Recognition," P. Xiu, D. Lopresti, H. Baird, G. Nagy, and E. Barney Smith, *Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition*, July 2009, Barcelona, Spain, pp. 216-220.



# A Bit of Good Luck

But what we'd like to have is ballots from a real election. Even better, the ballots would be from an important election where the voter markings present serious pattern recognition challenges.



Extremely close U.S. Senate race in State of Minnesota: six days after election, unofficial results showed Republican Norm Coleman leading Democratic challenger Al Franken by 206 votes out of nearly 3 million cast, a difference of less than 0.01%.



"Document Analysis Issues in Reading Optical Scan Ballots," D. Lopresti, G. Nagy, and E. Barney Smith, *Proceedings of the Ninth IAPR International Workshop on Document Analysis Systems*, June 2010, Boston, MA, pp. 105-112.

# A Bit of Good Luck

- Minnesota uses op-scan ballots.
- Closeness of election triggers a manual recount.
- Both sides are allowed to challenge validity of “questionable” ballots.
- Openness laws make challenged ballots a matter of public record.
- Ballot images made available on MN public radio website.
- PDF files contain 300 dpi TIF images!

[http://minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2008/11/19\\_challenged\\_ballots/](http://minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2008/11/19_challenged_ballots/)



# Minnesota Statutes

Remember that the guiding principle is *voter intent*. Here are a few key points to keep in mind when interpreting ballot markings:

- "A ballot shall not be rejected for a technical error that does not make it impossible to determine the voter's intent."
- "If a mark (X) is made out of its proper place, but so near a name or space as to indicate clearly the voter's intent, the vote shall be counted."
- "Misspelling or abbreviations of the names of write-in candidates shall be disregarded if the individual for whom the vote was intended can be clearly ascertained from the ballot."

<https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=204C.22>

# Minnesota Statutes

... and ...


- "If a voter uniformly uses a mark other than (X) which clearly indicates an intent to mark a name or to mark yes or no on a question, and the voter does not use (X) anywhere else on the ballot, a vote shall be counted for each candidate or response to a question marked.
- If a voter uses two or more distinct marks, such as (X) and some other mark, a vote shall be counted for each candidate or response to a question marked, unless the ballot is marked by distinguishing characteristics that make the entire ballot defective ..."

<https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=204C.22>

# Minnesota Statutes

... and ...

- “If the names of two candidates have been marked, and an attempt has been made to erase or obliterate one of the marks, a vote shall be counted for the remaining marked candidate.”
- “A ballot shall not be rejected merely because it is slightly soiled or defaced.”
- “If a ballot is marked by distinguishing characteristics in a manner making it evident that the voter intended to identify the ballot, the entire ballot is defective.”



Goal here is to prevent coercion or vote selling.

<https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=204C.22>



# Challenge: you be the judge

Challenged Ballots: You be the Judge | Campaign 2008 | Minnesota Pub...

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

http://minnesota.p...

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Challenged Ballots: You be the Judge ...

Ballot #1: The Jellyfish  
[View the whole ballot \(PDF opens in new window\)](#)


The Franken campaign challenged this Stearns County ballot due to "distinguishing marks." Marks from the reverse side of the ballot appear to have bled through and the voter appears to have attempted to rectify that by scribbling over the marks. (Secretary of State's Office)

U.S. SENATOR VOTE FOR ONE	write-in, if any
DEAN BARKLEY Independence	SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT SUPERVISOR DISTRICT 3 VOTE FOR ONE
NORM COLEMAN Republican	DAVID WELLER
AL FRANKEN Democratic-Farmer-Labor	write-in, if any
CHARLES ALDRICH Libertarian	SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT SUPERVISOR DISTRICT 4 VOTE FOR ONE
JAMES NIEMACKL Constitution	write-in, if any
write-in, if any	U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICT 7 VOTE FOR ONE
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICT 7 VOTE FOR ONE	DAVID BRINKMAN
	write-in, if any

Who gets the vote?

Norm Coleman  
 Al Franken  
 Nobody. Reject the ballot.

View Results vote



Who gets vote? Public opinion:

- Norm Coleman: 63% (7,626 votes)
- Al Franken: 4% (474 votes)
- Nobody: 33% (4,050 votes)

# Challenge: you be the judge

Challenged Ballots: You be the Judge | Campaign 2008 | Minnesota Pub...

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

http://minnesota.p

Challenged Ballots: You be the Judge ...

Ballot #2: The Just Because  
View the whole ballot (PDF opens in new window)

The Coleman campaign challenged this ballot from Hennepin County, saying the voter's editorial comments constitute a distinguishing mark on the ballot. (Secretary of State's Office)

write-in, if any

DEAN BARKLEY  
Independence

NORM COLEMAN  
Republican

AL FRANKEN  
Democratic-Farmer-Labor

CHARLES ALDRICH  
Libertarian

JAMES NIEMACKL  
Constitution


write-in, if any

Does Al Franken get the vote?

Yes, but "just because he is a Democrat."

No. The ballot is invalid.

View Results vote



Vote for Franken? Public opinion:

- Yes: 92% (11,069 votes)
- No: 8% (1,012 votes)

# Challenge: you be the judge

Challenged Ballots: You be the Judge | Campaign 2008 | Minnesota Public Radio NewsQ - Mozilla F...

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

http://minnesota.publicradio.org/feature

Most Visited Getting Started Latest Headlines

Challenged Ballots: You be the Judge ...

Ballot #5: The Yes  
View the whole ballot (PDF opens in new window)

The Coleman campaign challenged this Benton County ballot because of "unusual marks." The voter appears to have written the word 'yes' inside the oval next to Al Franken's name. (Secretary of State's Office)

U.S. SENATOR VOTE FOR ONE	
<input type="radio"/> DEAN BARKLEY Independence	<input type="radio"/> SOIL AND DIST
<input type="radio"/> NORM COLEMAN Republican	<input type="radio"/>
<input checked="" type="radio"/> AL FRANKEN Democratic-Farmer-Labor	<input checked="" type="radio"/> WAC
<input type="radio"/> CHARLES ALDRICH Libertarian	<input type="radio"/> write-i
<input type="radio"/> JAMES NIEMACKL Constitution	<input type="radio"/> SOIL AND W DISTRI
<input type="radio"/> write-in, if any	<input type="radio"/>

Does Al Franken get the vote?

Yes.  
 No.

View Results

U.S. SENATOR VOTE FOR ONE	
<input type="radio"/> DEAN BARKLEY Independence	<input type="radio"/> SOIL AND W DISTRI
<input type="radio"/> NORM COLEMAN Republican	<input type="radio"/> V
<input checked="" type="radio"/> AL FRANKEN Democratic-Farmer-Labor	<input checked="" type="radio"/> WAC
<input type="radio"/> CHARLES ALDRICH Libertarian	<input type="radio"/> write-i
<input type="radio"/> JAMES NIEMACKL Constitution	<input type="radio"/> SOIL AND W DISTRI
<input type="radio"/> write-in, if any	<input type="radio"/> V




  

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE	
<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/> BERI

Vote for Franken? Public opinion:

- Yes: 96% (11,250 votes)
- No: 4% (452 votes)

# Challenge: you be the judge



Vote for Coleman? Public opinion:

- Yes: 54% (6,080 votes)
- No: 46% (5,203 votes)

# MN Challenged Ballot Collection





How the ballot collection was generated and harvested:

- Ballots photocopied and originals stored in a secure location.
- Copies scanned to PDF using auto-feeder flatbed scanner.
- Ballot was two-sided, with both sides scanned simultaneously.
- I wrote a simple web "crawler" that automatically downloaded all the files and extracted TIF images from PDF.
- A total of 6,737 ballots in the set.
- Examination of the TIF suggests that ballots were scanned at 300 dpi bitonal, and that lossy compression was never used.
- Hence, they form an ideal dataset for research purposes.









# Sloppy-But-Valid Marks





# Non-Conforming Marking Styles




# Attempts to Cancel a Vote



# Votes that Look Cancelled




# Stray Marks and Bleedthrough





# Invalidating Markings



# Another Example of Recent Interest



Note that ballots were counted by hand in this case.

*See Dealing with doubtful paper ballots in GB :*

[http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/\\_\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0012/87699/UKPE-doubtfuls-booklet.pdf](http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/87699/UKPE-doubtfuls-booklet.pdf)

# Why isn't this an easy problem?

After all, ballots are just a simple type of form. We must read votes correctly, but we aren't expected to recognize write-ins.

Can't we just push up reject rate until accuracy reaches 100%?

Remember, we can't change rules in ways that violate the law. **VOTER INTENT** is the definition we must always follow.

To do this right, we must be prepared to:

- Reject any ballot that may contain "identifying marks."
- Recognize intent when mark is atypical or far from target.
- Accurately identify when a vote has been cancelled.





# Very Close Indeed

That's all well and good. But what really happened in Minnesota?

Date	Description	Votes for Coleman	Votes for Franken
11/18/08	Initial State Canvassing Board meeting.	1,211,590	1,211,375
12/5/08	After hand recount, not including challenged ballots.	1,209,240	1,209,228
12/20/08	After review of challenged ballots by State Canvassing Board.	1,211,901	1,211,950
1/5/09	After counting of improperly rejected absentee ballots by order of Minnesota Supreme Court. This total was certified by State Canvassing Board.	1,212,206	1,212,431
4/13/09	After counting of improperly rejected absentee ballots by order of three-judge panel during the election contest.	1,212,317	1,212,629

<http://www.sos.state.mn.us/elections-voting/2008-general-election-results/2008-state-recounts/>

# FAQ for Official Recount

WHEN DID THE RECOUNT BEGIN?

WHO SITS ON THE STATE CANVASSING BOARD?

HOW WILL THE RECOUNT WORK?

Every single vote cast for the U.S. Senate candidates will be recounted by hand.

The official recount is being conducted in approximately 110 locations throughout the state, generally in every county courthouse and in the city halls of major cities. In some locations more than one recount "station" will be used depending on the size of the jurisdiction.

The people doing the recounting are county election officials and election judges. Teams of recounters will examine each ballot and record the vote.

As many as four, perhaps even more, observers have been present as each ballot is recounted -- the election judge doing the recounting, representatives from each candidate's campaign, and any other interested parties. The recounts and canvassing board meetings are all open to the public.

[https://www.mprnews.org/story/2008/11/06/recount\\_faq](https://www.mprnews.org/story/2008/11/06/recount_faq)

WHAT ARE THE RECOUNT OFFICIALS LOOKING FOR?

The recounters are trying to determine the intent of the voter when they encounter problem ballots.

Most voters fill in the circle next to the candidate they choose. But sometimes an individual will put a check mark or an X next to a name. Others will circle a name. Ballots marked in that way cannot be scanned by the voting machines, so they wouldn't have been counted the first time around.

If a voter's intentions aren't clear by looking at a ballot, or if there is any objection to the decision being made by the election official by either one or both of the candidates' representatives, the ballots in dispute become "challenged" ballots that will go to the State Canvassing Board for review.

HOW LONG WILL THIS PROCESS TAKE?

HOW MUCH WILL THIS COST?

COULD THIS END UP BEING TAKEN TO COURT?

HOW WOULD THE CASE PROCEED?

WHY WOULD A CANDIDATE CHOOSE THIS PROCESS INSTEAD OF GOING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S RECOUNT?







# More Details on Official Recount

POLITICS & POLICY

## Judges' 'three votes' give Al Franken convincing win in Senate recount trial

By Jay Weiner | 04/13/09

 Email  Share  Tweet  Print

When this 2008 U.S. Senate race is finally over, when all the appeals are exhausted, when its history is written – based on what we know today -- it will be said that Al Franken won the election and the seat of the junior senator from Minnesota by 312 votes.

But that will not be exactly correct.

After Monday's long-awaited [final legal ruling](#) (PDF), add three more votes to Franken's tally: those of Judges Elizabeth Hayden, Kurt Marben and Denise Reilly.

Technically, the three-judge panel that oversaw a seven-week-long trial that generated 19,181 pages of legal filings "voted" against Norm Coleman in their unanimous 56-page opinion, with another 12 pages of exhibits.

It was Coleman's case to prove, and now he'll get another chance [when he appeals today's ruling](#) to the Minnesota Supreme Court within 10 days.

<https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2009/04/judges%E2%80%99-%E2%80%98three-votes%E2%80%99-give-al-franken-convincing-win-senate-recount-trial>

# Deciphering Official Recount Results

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G					L		N		P		R	S	T	U
1	County Name	County Number	Precinct Number	Precinct Name	Nov. 4, 2008	Nov. 4, 2008	RECOUNT					Ballot Disposition for COLEMAN		Ballot Disposition for FRANKEN		Ballot Disposition for Other		Change in Ballots Counted for COLEMAN	Change in Ballots Counted for FRANKEN	Final Recount Totals for COLEMAN	Final Recount Totals for FRANKEN
2					Votes Counted for COLEMAN	Votes Counted for FRANKEN	Number of Ballots for COLEMAN (as recounted)	Number of Ballots for FRANKEN (as recounted)	Number of All Other Ballots (as recounted)	COLEMAN and Other Ballots Challenged by FRANKEN	FRANKEN and Other Ballots Challenged by COLEMAN	W	CB	W	CB	W	CB				
144	ANOKA	2	4810	FRIDLEY V	407	547	407	547	206	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	407	547
145	ANOKA	2	4820	FRIDLEY V	575	710	574	709	292	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	575	710
146	ANOKA	2	4830	FRIDLEY V	231	416	231	417	153	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	231	417
147	ANOKA	2	4840	FRIDLEY V	297	498	297	497	186	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	297	498
148	ANOKA	2	5010	HAM LAKE	541	344	539	344	187	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	541	344
149	ANOKA	2	5020	HAM LAKE	850	396	849	396	252	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	850	396
150	ANOKA	2	5030	HAM LAKE	606	360	606	360	242	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	606	360
151	ANOKA	2	5040	HAM LAKE	904	488	902	488	283	2	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	904	489
152	ANOKA	2	5050	HAM LAKE	1029	531	1025	531	320	4	1	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1029	531
153	ANOKA	2	5060	HAM LAKE	895	436	895	436	296	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	895	437
154	ANOKA	2	5210	HILLTOP P	67	189	67	188	69	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	67	189
155	ANOKA	2	5410	LEXINGTO	350	401	348	401	215	3	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	350	401
156	ANOKA	2	5610	LINO LAKE	511	398	511	396	249	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	511	398
157	ANOKA	2	5620	LINO LAKE	821	588	822	588	331	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	823	588
158	ANOKA	2	5630	LINO LAKE	647	504	647	505	299	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	648	505
159	ANOKA	2	5640	LINO LAKE	1177	548	1174	548	310	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1177	548
160	ANOKA	2	5650	LINO LAKE	487	383	485	383	204	3	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	487	383
161	ANOKA	2	5660	LINO LAKE	1025	444	1023	442	275	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1025	444
162	ANOKA	2	5670	LINO LAKE	1007	545	1005	544	297	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	-1	-1	1006	544
163	ANOKA	2	5810	LINWOOD	1460	983	1455	981	606	4	5	3	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	1460	983
164	ANOKA	2	5910	NOWTHEN	1452	677	1448	672	479	4	5	4	0	2	2	0	1	0	-1	1452	676

Freely available as MS Excel file. But note ambiguity: work is needed to translate this into decisions on a ballot-by-ballot basis.

<https://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/1979/2008-final-recount-summary-by-precinct.xls>

# What Can Be Learned Here?

Counting ballots not just an abstract pattern recognition problem:

- A real task defined by pre-determined laws and processes.
- Important to society (not just labeling “cute cat” photos).
- Inherently political, but designed to be as fair as possible.
- Expressed in terms of human interpretation.
- Ambiguity is utterly inherent (real world is messy).
- “Noisy labeling” is utterly inherent.
- AI (pattern recognition) can and must do better.


In other words, this is a perfect problem to study for those of us who want our research to have an impact in the real world.

# A Sad Epilogue ...

Google AI Franken

All **News** Images Videos Shopping More Settings Tools

About 35,200,000 results (0.37 seconds)

 **AI Franken: two more women accuse senator of sexual misconduct**  
The Guardian - 3 hours ago  
Two more women have come forward to accuse Democratic senator **AI Franken** of sexual impropriety, according to reports on Thursday. Stephanie Kemplin, an Ohio army veteran, told CNN that Franken groped her breast in 2003, while she was deployed in Kuwait and he was a comedian on a tour of the ...







**AI Franken Accused of Groping Army Veteran in 2003**  
Variety - 7 hours ago

New England Elected Official Says **AI Franken** Tried to Give Her A ...  
Highly Cited - Jezebel - 7 hours ago

All the Women Who Have Accused Sen. **AI Franken** of Sexual ...  
International - TIME - 3 hours ago


Top Democrat tells **AI Franken** to QUIT as more victims come ...  
In-Depth - Daily Mail - 46 minutes ago

Two More Women Accuse **AI Franken** of Sexual Misconduct  
Blog - Slate Magazine (blog) - 4 hours ago

TIME BBC News Variety Daily Mail AV Club Deadline

[View all](#)

 **Bill Clinton's Accusers Storm AI Franken's Office Demanding His ...**  
Observer - 5 hours ago  
Women who accused former President Bill Clinton of sexual misconduct stormed

# Adapting the Turing Test for Declaring a Problem Solved

An interesting thought experiment, given the demand for algorithms that can perform at human levels when users are free to act in ways that confound the system.

# When is a Problem Solved?

## The Turing Test:

"A problem is solved if there is a method which has been widely publicized and documented and freely available to the community which generates output for a given input that a human judge cannot reliably distinguish from the output of a human expert."

Differs significantly from employing ground-truth provided by a human expert in advance.

"Adapting the Turing Test for Declaring Document Analysis Problems Solved," D. Lopresti and G. Nagy, Proceedings of the Tenth IAPR International Workshop on Document Analysis Systems (DAS 2012), March 2012, Gold Coast, Australia, 5 pages.



# The Imitation Game

VOL. LIX. No. 236.]

[October, 1950

## MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

### I.—COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE

By A. M. TURING

#### 1. *The Imitation Game.*

I PROPOSE to consider the question, 'Can machines think?' This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms 'machine' and 'think'. The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous. If the meaning of the words 'machine' and 'think' are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to the question, 'Can machines think?' is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words.

The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the 'imitation game'. It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says either 'X is A and Y is B' or 'X is B and Y is A'. The interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B thus:

C: Will X please tell me the length of his or her hair?  
Now suppose X is actually A, then A must answer. It is A's

28

433

#### 1. *The Imitation Game.*

I PROPOSE to consider the question, 'Can machines think?' This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms 'machine' and 'think'. The definitions might be framed so as to


The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the 'imitation game'. It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end

We now ask the question, 'What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?' Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, 'Can machines think?'

A. M. Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," *Mind*, vol. 59, no. 236, October 1950, pp. 433-460.

"Adapting the Turing Test for Declaring Document Analysis Problems Solved," D. Lopresti and G. Nagy, Proceedings of the Tenth IAPR International Workshop on Document Analysis Systems (DAS 2012), March 2012, Gold Coast, Australia, 5 pages.

# The Turing Test




Is  $SuccessRate_2 \approx SuccessRate_1$  ?

"Adapting the Turing Test for Declaring Document Analysis Problems Solved," D. Lopresti and G. Nagy, Proceedings of the Tenth IAPR International Workshop on Document Analysis Systems (DAS 2012), March 2012, Gold Coast, Australia, 5 pages.

# The Turing Test

The Turing Test is an elegantly simple idea, so it should be simple to implement, right?



Is SuccessRate no better than random chance ?

- Note this differs from Turing's original formulation.
- When considering a real implementation, other, more serious complications arise.

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# Long Bet Rules

Turing was nonspecific about how to administer his Test, but concreteness is needed when \$20,000 is at stake.

- Each of three Turing Test judges is to conduct an online interview ("chat") with each of four human players as well as the machine for two hours.
- At the end of these interviews, the judges indicate whether or not each candidate is human and also rank them from "least human" to "most human."
- The machine is said to pass the Turing Test if it fools two or more judges and if its median rank is equal to or greater than at least two of the human players.

"Adapting the Turing Test for Declaring Document Analysis Problems Solved," D. Lopresti and G. Nagy, Proceedings of the Tenth IAPR International Workshop on Document Analysis Systems (DAS 2012), March 2012, Gold Coast, Australia, 5 pages.

# Adapting the Turing Test

The Long Bet is a one-time event with a significant amount of prize money involved. As a result, it makes sense to employ a heavy-weight protocol for the test.

How can the Turing Test be applied in document analysis?


- What are the essential qualities to preserve?
- What can be dispensed with, or at least simplified?
- When implemented, how would the test "look"?
- When might such a test be appropriate?

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# Properties to Preserve #1


Human judgment is applied to determine a simple machine/human distinction and nothing more complex than this. Automated evaluation (i.e., a computation to determine how "similar" a machine output is to some predefined human "ground truth") is ruled out.



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# Properties to Preserve #2


A judge may ask any number of questions before making a determination. A "question" here is a challenge that requires a response from the player. For document analysis applications, this will normally consist of a page image to be processed in some way.



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# Properties to Preserve #3


The judge decides which questions to use, and is free to conduct the questioning of the players without constraint on the choice, sequence, and number of questions.



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# Properties to Preserve #4

A series of such evaluations, with anyone being allowed to volunteer to serve as judge or as the human player, is conducted before declaring a problem "solved" (if/when the success rates of the best-performing judges are statistically no better than random).



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# Properties to Adapt


Some aspects of Turing's original Test must be updated:

- The judge and players do not interact via a natural language question-and-answer process. Instead, they employ a graphical user interface which supports the upload of image files and visual inspection of results.
- The domain of discourse is no longer open-ended. Note that this replaces Turing's original question "Can machines think?" with our "Is this problem solved?"

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# GUI from Judge's Perspective



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# Other Considerations

Additional details to be addressed, some easy, some hard:

- Anyone should be permitted to volunteer at any point in time to serve as the judge or the human player.
- The need to pair a judge with a human player can be addressed through crowdsourcing (e.g., using micro-payments to recruit subjects like Mechanical Turk).
- How can we eliminate out-of-scope querying / collusion?
- Which problems are appropriate to test this way? (Avoid tedious tasks where machines are "too good.")
- How can learning (by human, by machine) be included?

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Hopefully this has given you some points to think about ...  
if you're interested in collaborating to turn MN ballots  
into a community resource for exploring interesting and  
important "noisy labeling" problem, let me know!

Thank you!  
Merci!!